Managing Information Access in Data-Rich Enterprises with Escalation and Incentives

  • Authors:
  • Xia Zhao;M. Johnson

  • Affiliations:
  • Bryan School of Business and Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro;Glassmeyer / McNamee Center for Digital Strategies, Science of Administration Management at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Electronic Commerce
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Managing information access in highly dynamic e-business environments is increasingly challenging. In large firms with thousands of employees accessing thousands of applications and data sources, managers must protect information against misuse but ensure that employees can access the information needed for value creation. An escalation scheme with audits to increase flexibility while maintaining security is proposed. By coupling incentives with controls, escalation aligns employees' self-interest with the firm's profit objective. A game-theoretic model shows that an incentives-based policy with escalation and audit can control both overentitlement and underentitlement while maintaining flexibility.