Swarm intelligence: from natural to artificial systems
Swarm intelligence: from natural to artificial systems
Reliability Issues in Computing System Design
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Reliability, Availability, Dependability and Performability: A User-centered View
Reliability, Availability, Dependability and Performability: A User-centered View
Ant-Based Adaptive Trust Evidence Distribution in MANET
ICDCSW '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops - W7: EC (ICDCSW'04) - Volume 7
Towards correcting input data errors probabilistically using integrity constraints
MobiDE '06 Proceedings of the 5th ACM international workshop on Data engineering for wireless and mobile access
Inconsistency in deception for defense
NSPW '06 Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on New security paradigms
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Negative representations of information
International Journal of Information Security
Resilience in computer systems and networks
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
Resilient control systems: next generation design research
HSI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Human System Interactions
E unibus pluram: massive-scale software diversity as a defense mechanism
Proceedings of the 2010 workshop on New security paradigms
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In applied sciences there is a tendency to rely on terminology that is either ill-defined or applied inconsistently across areas of research and application domains. Examples in information assurance include the terms resilience, robustness and survivability, where there exists subtle shades of meaning between researchers. These nuances can result in confusion and misinterpretations of goals and results, hampering communication and complicating collaboration. In this paper, we propose security-related definitions for these terms. Using this terminology, we argue that research in these areas must consider the functionality of the system holistically, beginning with a careful examination of what we actually want the system to do. We note that much of the published research focuses on a single aspect of a system -- availability -- as opposed to the system's ability to complete its function without disclosing confidential information or, to a lesser extent, with the correct output. Finally, we discuss ways in which researchers can explore resilience with respect to integrity, availability and confidentiality.