Belief structures, possibility theory and decomposable confidence measures on finite sets
Computers and Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
Epistemic entrenchment and possibilistic logic
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations
Artificial Intelligence
Revisions of knowledge systems using epistemic entrenchment
TARK '88 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Representing partial ignorance
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A theoretical framework for possibilistic independence in a weakly ordered setting
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Confidence Relations as a Basis for Uncertainty Modeling, Plausible Reasoning, and Belief Revision
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Artificial Intelligence - Special issue: Fuzzy set and possibility theory-based methods in artificial intelligence
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International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Ordinal and probabilistic representations of acceptance
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Possibilistic and standard probabilistic semantics of conditional knowledge
AAAI'97/IAAI'97 Proceedings of the fourteenth national conference on artificial intelligence and ninth conference on Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Comparative uncertainty, belief functions and accepted beliefs
UAI'98 Proceedings of the Fourteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Decision-making under ordinal preferences and comparative uncertainty
UAI'97 Proceedings of the Thirteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
A qualitative Markov assumption and its implications for belief change
UAI'96 Proceedings of the Twelfth international conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Acceptance, conditionals, and belief revision
WCII'02 Proceedings of the 2002 international conference on Conditionals, Information, and Inference
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Accepting a proposition means that our confidence in this proposition is strictly greater than the confidence in its negation. This paper investigates the subclass of uncertainty measures, expressing confidence, that capture the idea of acceptance, what we call acceptance functions. Due to the monotonicity property of confidence measures, the acceptance of a proposition entails the acceptance of any of its logical consequences. In agreement with the idea that a belief set (in the sense of Gärdenfors) must be closed under logical consequence, it is also required that the separate acceptance of two propositions entail the acceptance of their conjunction. Necessity (and possibility) measures agree with this view of acceptance while probability and belief functions generally do not. General properties of acceptance functions are established. The motivation behind this work is the investigation of a setting for belief revision more general than the one proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, in connection with the notion of conditioning.