Limitations of skeptical default reasoning

Authors:
Jens Doerpmund
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Venue:
UAI'97 Proceedings of the Thirteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Year:
1997

Citing 3
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Abstract

Poole has shown that nonmonotonic logics do not handle the lottery paradox correctly. In this paper we will show that Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning fails for the same reason: defeasible reasoning is incompatible with the skeptical notion of derivability.