Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games

  • Authors:
  • Sebastian Aland;Dominic Dumrauf;Martin Gairing;Burkhard Monien;Florian Schoppmann

  • Affiliations:
  • sebaland@upb.de and dumrauf@upb.de and bm@upb.de and fschopp@upb.de;-;gairing@liverpool.ac.uk;-;-

  • Venue:
  • SIAM Journal on Computing
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We show exact values for the worst-case price of anarchy in weighted and unweighted (atomic unsplittable) congestion games, provided that all cost functions are bounded-degree polynomials with nonnegative coefficients. The given values also hold for weighted and unweighted network congestion games.