Analysis of the increase and decrease algorithms for congestion avoidance in computer networks
Computer Networks and ISDN Systems
Paris metro pricing for the internet
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Net neutrality: the technical side of the debate: a white paper
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Can ISPs be profitable without violating “network neutrality”?
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2010 conference
Application neutrality and a paradox of side payments
Proceedings of the Re-Architecting the Internet Workshop
Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball internet service providers
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A preference model for deciding the market share of network service providers
Proceedings of the 24th International Teletraffic Congress
Proceedings of the 24th International Teletraffic Congress
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Network neutrality and the role of regulation on the Internet have been heavily debated in recent times. Amongst the various definitions of network neutrality, we focus on the one which prohibits paid prioritization of content. We develop a model of the Internet ecosystem in terms of three primary players: consumers, ISPs and content providers. We analyze this issue from the point of view of the consumer, and target the desired system state that maximizes consumer surplus. By analyzing the various structures of an ISP market, we obtain different conclusions on the desirability of regulation. We also introduce the notion of a Public Option ISP, an ISP that carries traffic in a network neutral manner. We find (i) in a monopolistic scenario, network neutral regulations might benefit consumers; however, the introduction of a Public Option ISP is even better, as it aligns the interests of the monopolistic ISP with the consumer surplus and (ii) in an oligopolistic scenario, the presence of a Public Option ISP is again preferable to network neutral regulations, although the presence of competing non-neutral ISPs provides the most desirable situation for the consumers. Lastly, the ISP survivability is an orthogonal direction towards the debate. Nevertheless, our findings reveal that even ISPs can survive, network neutrality might still not be needed.