Evolving behaviors in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
Evolutionary Computation
A voter model of the spatial prisoner's dilemma
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
Behavioral diversity, choices and noise in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
Evolutionary game theoretic approach for modeling civil violence
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
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The iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) has been used as a model for investigating cooperation in nature. Here, we present an analysis of the evolution of reciprocal cooperation in a dynamically simulated environment in which individual agents are free to move in space, interacting with their nearest neighbors in fixed-length IPD games. Agents aim to avoid those against whom they score poorly, and to seek out those against whom they score highly. Individuals are modeled using finite state machines, allowing us to extend previous work on kin group markers. Though they have no direct effect on an individual's strategy, such markers do lead to the emergence of coherent, mutually-cooperating sub-populations.