An Attack on RSA Given a Small Fraction of the Private Key Bits
ASIACRYPT '98 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Partial key exposure attacks on RSA up to full size exponents
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Cryptanalysis of RSA with private key d less than N0.292
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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We describe an attack on the RSA cryptosystem when the private exponent d is chosen to be 'small', under the condition that a sufficient amount of bits of d is available to the attacker. The attack uses a 2-dimensional lattice and is therefore (in the area of the keyspace where it applies) more efficient than known attacks using Coppersmith techniques. Moreover, we show that the attacks of Wiener and Verheul/Van Tilborg, using continued fractions techniques, are special deterministic cases of our attack, which in general is heuristic.