ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: a modular approach
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
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Security protocols are moving from the network and transport layers into application layers to adapt on one hand to new paradigms in distributed applications, and to achieve on the other hand higher level security properties such as intrusion tolerance. We argue that these new protocols ensuring, for instance, intrusion tolerance can be built with the same building blocks as traditional protocols ensuring confidentiality, authentication, nonrepudiation, fair exchange, and anonymity, but need to integrate additional application-specific requirements. This calls for a new design approach where both application and security requirements are refined simultaneously. Our approach, called protocol codesign, achieves this goal by providing a rigorous methodology for designing protocols based on the composition of basic services.