Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy
Mining the network value of customers
Proceedings of the seventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
The Economics of Network Industries
The Economics of Network Industries
Mining knowledge-sharing sites for viral marketing
Proceedings of the eighth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Competitive influence maximization in social networks
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Submodularity of Influence in Social Networks: From Local to Global
SIAM Journal on Computing
Limiting the spread of misinformation in social networks
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Competitive contagion in networks
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Containment of misinformation spread in online social networks
Proceedings of the 3rd Annual ACM Web Science Conference
Strategyproof mechanisms for competitive influence in networks
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Analysis of misinformation containment in online social networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for customers located in a “social network”. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies exist and are unique. Indeed there are closed-form formulae for the NE in terms of the exogenous parameters of the model, which enables us to compute NE in polynomial time. An important structural feature of NE is that, if there are no a priori biases between customers and firms, then there is a cut-off level above which high cost firms are blockaded at an NE, while the rest compete uniformly throughout the network. We finally explore the relation between the connectivity of a customer and the money firms spend on him. This relation becomes particularly transparent when externalities are dominant: NE can be characterized in terms of the invariant measures on the recurrent classes of the Markov chain underlying the social network.