Games of connectivity

Authors:
Pradeep Dubey;Rahul Garg
Affiliations:
Center for Game Theory in Economics, Stony Brook University;IBM India Research Lab, New Delhi, India
Venue:
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2006

Citing 3
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Abstract

We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We pinpoint conditions under which the induced cooperative game is supermodular (convex). Our analysis is in a lattice-theoretic framework, which is at once simple and able to encompass a wide variety of seemingly disparate models. JEL Classification: C71, D82, L96.