Price of anarchy for polynomial wardrop games

  • Authors:
  • Dominic Dumrauf;Martin Gairing

  • Affiliations:
  • Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics, University of Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany;Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics, University of Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany

  • Venue:
  • WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In this work, we consider Wardrop games where traffic has to be routed through a shared network. Traffic is allowed to be split into arbitrary pieces and can be modeled as network flow. For each edge in the network there is a latency function that specifies the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. In a Wardrop equilibrium, all used paths between a given source-destination pair have equal and minimal latency. In this paper, we allow for polynomial latency functions with an upper bound d and a lower bound s on the degree of all monomials that appear in the polynomials. For this environment, we prove upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy.