Secretary problems with competing employers

Authors:
Nicole Immorlica;Robert Kleinberg;Mohammad Mahdian
Affiliations:
Microsoft Research, One Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA;UC Berkeley Computer Science Division, Cornell University Computer Science Department;Microsoft Research, One Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA
Venue:
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2006

Citing 2
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Abstract

In many decentralized labor markets, job candidates are offered positions at very early stages in the hiring process. It has been argued that these early offers are an effect of the competition between employers for the best candidate. This work studies the timing of offers in a theoretical model based on the classical secretary problem. We consider a secretary problem with multiple employers and study the equilibria of the induced game. Our results confirm the observation of early offers in labor markets: for several classes of strategies based on optimal stopping theory, as the number of employers grows, the timing of the earliest offer decreases.