Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system
Proceedings of the tenth international conference on Information and knowledge management
Notions of reputation in multi-agents systems: a review
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
A Social Mechanism of Reputation Management in Electronic Communities
CIA '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents IV, The Future of Information Agents in Cyberspace
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
Detecting deception in reputation management
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
An incentive compatible reputation mechanism
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Collaboration of untrusting peers with changing interests
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Adaptive Collaboration in Peer-to-Peer Systems
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Incentives for P2P Fair Resource Sharing
P2P '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision
Decision Support Systems
Reputation and audits for self-organizing storage
Proceedings of the workshop on Security in Opportunistic and SOCial networks
Recommendation Retrieval in Reputation Assessment for Peer-to-Peer Systems
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Effective Usage of Computational Trust Models in Rational Environments
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
An Inspection Game to Provide Incentive for Cooperation with Corrupted Inspectors
ASONAM '12 Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM 2012)
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In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer services. The mechanism we propose achieves high robustness against malicious peers (from individual or collusive ones) and provides incentive for participation. We show that the quality of the reputation value of trustworthy and participating peers is always better than the one of cheating and non participating ones. Finally we formally prove that, even when a high fraction of peers of the system exhibits a collusive behavior, a correct peer can still compute an accurate reputation mechanism towards a server, at the expense of a reasonable convergence time.