Regulating social exchanges between personality-based non-transparent agents

Authors:
G. P. Dimuro;A. C. R. Costa;L. V. Gonçalves;A. Hübner
Affiliations:
Escola de Informática, PPGINF, Universidade Católica de Pelotas, Pelotas, Brazil;Escola de Informática, PPGINF, Universidade Católica de Pelotas, Pelotas, Brazil;Escola de Informática, PPGINF, Universidade Católica de Pelotas, Pelotas, Brazil;Escola de Informática, PPGINF, Universidade Católica de Pelotas, Pelotas, Brazil
Venue:
MICAI'06 Proceedings of the 5th Mexican international conference on Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2006

Citing 7
Cited 1

Engineering Social Order

ESAW '00 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Engineering Societies in the Agent World: Revised Papers
Decisions Based upon Multiple Values: The BVG Agent Architecture

EPIA '99 Proceedings of the 9th Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Progress in Artificial Intelligence
A Market Protocol for Decentralized Task Allocation

ICMAS '98 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems
Taming decentralized POMDPs: towards efficient policy computation for multiagent settings

IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Planning and acting in partially observable stochastic domains

Artificial Intelligence
Analysing partner selection through exchange values

MABS'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Multi-Agent-Based Simulation
Exchange values and self-regulation of exchanges in multi-agent systems: the provisory, centralized model

ESOA'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Engineering Self-Organising Systems

Centralized Regulation of Social Exchanges Between Personality-Based Agents

Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems II

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper extends the scope of the model of regulation of social exchanges based on the concept of a supervisor of social equilibrium. We allow the supervisor to interact with personality-based agents that control the supervisor access to their internal states, behaving either as transparent agents (agents that allow full external access to their internal states) or as non-transparent agents (agents that restrict such external access). The agents may have different personality traits, which induce different attitudes towards both the regulation mechanism and the possible profits of social exchanges. Also, these personality traits influence the agents' evaluation of their current status. To be able to reason about the social exchanges among personality-based non-transparent agents, the equilibrium supervisor models the system as a Hidden Markov Model.