A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
The economics of information security investment
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Managing Information Security Risks: The Octave Approach
Managing Information Security Risks: The Octave Approach
Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Constructing attack scenarios through correlation of intrusion alerts
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach
Representing TCP/IP Connectivity For Topological Analysis of Network Security
ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Rule-based topological vulnerability analysis
MMM-ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architectures for Computer Network Security
Model-based qualitative risk assessment for availability of IT infrastructures
Software and Systems Modeling (SoSyM)
An analysis of cyclical interdependencies in critical infrastructures
CRITIS'07 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security
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We outline a framework for the risk assessment of information infrastructures that generalizes the notion of dependency with respect to security attributes such as confidentiality, integrity or availability. Dependencies are used to model an infrastructure at distinct abstraction levels, to discover attack strategies and to define risk mitigation plans. A plan is formulated in terms of set of countermeasures because single countermeasures may be ineffective due to alternative threat attack strategies. We do not detail the assessment steps and focus on the integration of their results to define risk mitigation plans. Lastly, we discuss the development of programming tools to support the assessment.