A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms
Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference
Verification of Cooperating Systems - An Approach Based on Formal Languages
Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference
Two Formal Analys s of Attack Graphs
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Managing attack graph complexity through visual hierarchical aggregation
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Visualization and data mining for computer security
Multiple Coordinated Views for Network Attack Graphs
VIZSEC '05 Proceedings of the IEEE Workshops on Visualization for Computer Security
M2D2: a formal data model for IDS alert correlation
RAID'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
Improving CVSS-based vulnerability prioritization and response with context information
ESEM '09 Proceedings of the 2009 3rd International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement
Processing multi-parameter attacktrees with estimated parameter values
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The systematic protection of critical information infrastructures requires an analytical process to identify the critical components and their interplay, to determine the threats and vulnerabilities, to assess the risks and to prioritise countermeasures where risk is unacceptable. This paper presents an integrated framework for model-based symbolic interpretation, simulation and analysis with a comprehensive approach focussing on the validation of network security policies. A graph of all possible attack paths is automatically computed from the model of an ICT network, of vulnerabilities, exploits and an attacker strategy. Constraints on this graph are given by a model of the network security policy. The impact of changes to security policies can be computed and visualised by finding differences in the attack graphs. A unique feature of the presented approach is, that abstract representations of these graphs can be computed that allow comparison of focussed views on the behaviour of the system. This guides optimal adaptation of the security policy to the given vulnerability setting.