Counterexamples to hardness amplification beyond negligible
TCC'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Simultaneously resettable arguments of knowledge
TCC'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Implementing resettable UC-Functionalities with untrusted tamper-proof hardware-tokens
TCC'13 Proceedings of the 10th theory of cryptography conference on Theory of Cryptography
Non-black-box simulation in the fully concurrent setting
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the impossibility of approximate obfuscation and applications to resettable cryptography
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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Secure computation protocols inherently involve multiple rounds of interaction among the parties where, typically a party has to keep a state about what has happened in the protocol so far and then \emph{wait} for the other party to respond. We study if this is inherent. In particular, we study the possibility of designing cryptographic protocols where the parties can be completely stateless and compute the outgoing message by applying a single fixed function to the incoming message (independent of any state). The problem of designing stateless secure computation protocols can be reduced to the problem of designing protocols satisfying the notion of reset table computation introduced by Canetti, Goldreich, Gold wasser and Micali (FOCS'01) and widely studied thereafter. The current start of art in reset table computation allows for construction of protocols which provide security only when a \emph{single predetermined} party is reset table \cite{GoyalSa09}. An exception is for the case of the zero-knowledge functionality for which a protocol in which both parties are reset table was recently obtained by Deng, Goyal and Sahai (FOCS'09). The fundamental question left open in this sequence of works is, whether fully-reset table computation is possible, when:\begin{enumerate}\item An adversary can corrupt any number of parties, and\item The adversary can reset any party to its original state during the execution of the protocol and can restart the protocol. \end{enumerate}In this paper, we resolve the above problem by constructing secure protocols realizing \emph{any} efficiently computable multi-party functionality in the plain model under standard cryptographic assumptions. First, we construct a Fully-Reset table Simulation Sound Zero-Knowledge (ss-rs-rZK) protocol. Next, based on these ss-rs-rZK protocols, we show how to compile any semi-honest secure protocol into a protocol secure against fully resetting adversaries. Next, we study a seemingly unrelated open question: ``Does there exist a functionality which, in the concurrent setting, is impossible to securely realize using BB simulation but can be realized using NBB simulation ? & quot;. We resolve the above question in the affirmative by giving an example of such a (reactive) functionality. Somewhat surprisingly, this is done by making a connection to the existence of a fully reset table simulation sound zero-knowledge protocol.