Coalition formation in p2p file sharing systems

Authors:
M. V. Belmonte;R. Conejo;M. Díaz;J. L. Pérez-de-la-Cruz
Affiliations:
E.T.S.I. Informática, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, SPAIN;E.T.S.I. Informática, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, SPAIN;E.T.S.I. Informática, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, SPAIN;E.T.S.I. Informática, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, SPAIN
Venue:
CAEPIA'05 Proceedings of the 11th Spanish association conference on Current Topics in Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2005

Citing 5
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Abstract

P2P file sharing systems are distributed systems consisting of interconnected nodes able to organize themselves in networks, with the purpose of sharing content. Recent empirical studies have shown that they suffer from freeloaders, that is, peers that consume many more resources or content than they contribute. In this paper we propose a coalition formation based incentive mechanism for P2P file sharing systems, that improves the system performance for the coalition participant peers. In addition, it discourages free-loader like behavior. The mechanism presents a formal approach to the problem based on game theory that takes into account the rational and self-interested behavior of the peers.