Virtual games: a new approach to implementation of social choice rules

  • Authors:

  • Dániel L. Kovács

  • Affiliations:

  • Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Informatics, Department of Measurement and Information Systems, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary

  • Venue:
  • CEEMAS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international Central and Eastern European conference on Multi-Agent Systems and Applications
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Intelligent systems play a crucial role in our everyday life. Yet there is still no general concept for designing such systems (at an individual, social, and inter-social level). Intelligent systems are designed on a case-by-case basis, mostly in an ad-hoc fashion lacking any kind of general design strategy. Nonetheless there are theories, which capture some profound aspects of the problem. One of them is the theory of implementation of social choice rules, which is concerned with the collective behavior in multi-agent systems. However the roots of the theory lie in social sciences, so its approach is not suitable enough for multi-agent system design. This article introduces a new game theoretic approach to implementation of social choice rules, which enables design of provably optimal multi-agent system without any restriction in general.