Non-randomness in eSTREAM candidates salsa20 and TSC-4

  • Authors:
  • Simon Fischer;Willi Meier;Côme Berbain;Jean-François Biasse;M. J. B. Robshaw

  • Affiliations:
  • FHNW, Windisch, Switzerland;FHNW, Windisch, Switzerland;FTRD, Issy les Moulineaux, France;FTRD, Issy les Moulineaux, France;FTRD, Issy les Moulineaux, France

  • Venue:
  • INDOCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptology in India
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Stream cipher initialisation should ensure that the initial state or keystream is not detectably related to the key and initialisation vector. In this paper we analyse the key/IV setup of the eSTREAM Phase 2 candidates Salsa20 and TSC-4. In the case of Salsa20 we demonstrate a key recovery attack on six rounds and observe non-randomness after seven. For TSC-4, non-randomness over the full eight-round initialisation phase is detected, but would also persist for more rounds.