How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
How to prove all NP-statements in zero-knowledge, and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Pseudo-random generation from one-way functions
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic applications
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure signatures
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Zero-knowledge undeniable signatures (extended abstract)
EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
SIAM Journal on Computing
RSA-Based Undeniable Signatures for General Moduli
CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Bit Commitment Using Pseudo-Randomness
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Convertible Undeniable Signatures
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Designated Confirmer Signatures and Public-Key Encryption are Equivalent
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
RSA-Based Undeniable Signatures
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Designated verifier proofs and their applications
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
New convertible undeniable signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Confirmer signature schemes secure against adaptive adversaries
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient concurrent zero-knowledge in the auxiliary string model
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Invisibility and anonymity of undeniable and confirmer signatures
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Statistical secrecy and multibit commitments
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We introduce a new digital signature model, called conditionally verifiable signature (CVS), which allows a signer to specify and convince a recipient under what conditions his signature would become valid and verifiable; the resulting signature is not publicly verifiable immediately but can be converted back into an ordinary one (verifiable by anyone) after the recipient has obtained proofs, in the form of signatures/endorsements from a number of third party witnesses, that all the specified conditions have been fulfilled. A fairly wide set of conditions could be specified in CVS. The only job of the witnesses is to certify the fulfillment of a condition and none of them need to be actively involved in the actual signature conversion, thus protecting user privacy. It is guaranteed that the recipient cannot cheat as long as at least one of the specified witnesses does not collude. We formalize the concept of CVS and give a generic CVS construction based on any CPA-secure identity based encryption (IBE) scheme. Theoretically, we show that the existence of IBE with indistinguishability under a chosen plaintext attack (a weaker notion than the standard one) is necessary and sufficient for the construction of a secure CVS.