CBC MACs for Arbitrary-Length Messages: The Three-Key Constructions
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Online Ciphers and the Hash-CBC Construction
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Security of Cipher Block Chaining
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Block-Cipher Mode of Operation for Parallelizable Message Authentication
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Improved security analyses for CBC MACs
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
PRF domain extension using DAGs
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
INDOCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Security analysis of the mode of JH hash function
FSE'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Fast software encryption
A unified method for improving PRF bounds for a class of blockcipher based MACs
FSE'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Fast software encryption
On the indifferentiability of fugue and luffa
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
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Recently Bernstein [4] has provided a simpler proof of indistinguishability of CBC construction [3] which is giving insight of the construction. Indistinguishability of any function intuitively means that the function behaves very closely to a uniform random function. In this paper we make a unifying and simple approach to prove indistinguishability of many existing constructions. We first revisit Bernstein's proof. Using this idea we can show a simpler proof of indistinguishability of a class of DAG based construction [8], XCBC [5], TMAC [9], OMAC [7] and PMAC [6]. We also provide a simpler proof for stronger bound of CBC [1] and a simpler proof of security of on-line Hash-CBC [2]. We note that there is a flaw in the security proof of Hash-CBC given in [2]. This paper will help to understand security analysis of indistinguishability of many constructions in a simpler way.