Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Price competition with elastic traffic
Networks - Games, Interdiction, and Human Interaction Problems on Networks
Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The “Price of Anarchy” Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
Mathematics of Operations Research
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
Theory of Computing Systems
The price of anarchy of cournot oligopoly
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands
Operations Research Letters
A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
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Resource allocation problems play a key role in many applications, including traffic networks, telecommunication networks, and economics. In most applications, the allocation of resources is determined by a finite number of independent players, each optimizing an individual objective function. An important question in all these applications is the degree of suboptimality caused by selfish resource allocation. We consider the worst-case efficiency of cost sharing methods in resource allocation games in terms of the ratio of the minimum guaranteed surplus of a Nash equilibrium and the maximal surplus. Our main technical result is an upper bound on the efficiency loss that depends on the class of allowable cost functions and the class of allowable cost sharing methods. We demonstrate the power of this bound by evaluating the worst-case efficiency loss for three well-known cost sharing methods: incremental cost sharing, marginal cost pricing, and average cost sharing.