Resource control for elastic traffic in CDMA networks
Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow's internet
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
QoS Rewards and Risks: A Multi-market Approach to Resource Allocation
NETWORKING '00 Proceedings of the IFIP-TC6 / European Commission International Conference on Broadband Communications, High Performance Networking, and Performance of Communication Networks
Auction-based resource reservation in 2.5/3G networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Service differentiation in third generation mobile networks
QofIS'02/ICQT'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on quality of future internet services and internet charging and QoS technologies 2nd international conference on From QoS provisioning to QoS charging
Wireless incentive engineering
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In WCDMA networks, most economic-based resource management algorithms only assumed that network users were obedient, that is, users only accepted the price declared by network, which is called as price acceptation mechanism. Many research issues argued that it is necessary to accommodate, if possible, to use self-interest behaviours of users to strengthen the technical architecture of network engineering. Thus, this paper explicitly considered the selfishness of users, investigated the price anticipation mechanism in WCDMA networks, in which users acted as price anticipators. By price anticipator it meant users anticipated the effect of their behaviours on the network resource allocation, and adopted strategy correspondingly. From the view point of game theory, we investigated equilibrium properties of the price anticipation mechanism in WCDMA networks, and, through two scenarios, illustrated the relationship between price anticipation mechanism and price acceptation mechanism from the viewpoint of network revenue. Finally, we drew the conclusion that, the network revenue generated in price anticipation mechanism was less than revenue generated in price acceptation mechanism, (the difference between those two mechanisms is called as “price as anarchy”), and the network revenue generated in those two mechanisms tends to be consistent, when the effect of individual user is negligible.