On-line multi-attributes procurement combinatorial auctions bidding strategies

Authors:
Jian Chen;He Huang
Affiliations:
School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Venue:
ICCS'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Computational Science - Volume Part III
Year:
2005

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Abstract

Based on the work of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) about combinatorial auctions bidding equilibrium analysis and Che’s (1993) research about one-unit multi-attributes auctions, we construct a multi-attributes procurement combinatorial auction (MAPCA) for 2 objects, through a first-score, sealed-bid format. There are two kinds of bidders: n simple bidders and m diverse bidders considered in this model. With some assumptions, we finally obtain the equilibrium bidding strategies for the both two kinds of bidders.