Bayesian and non-Bayesian evidential updating
Artificial Intelligence
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
Assumptions, beliefs and probabilities
Artificial Intelligence
Updating with belief functions, ordinal conditional functions and possibility measures
UAI '90 Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Uncertainty, belief, and probability
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Characterizing belief with minimum commitment
IJCAI'91 Proceedings of the 12th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Two views of belief: belief as generalized probability and belief as evidence
AAAI'90 Proceedings of the eighth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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We motivate and describe a theory of belief in this paper. This theory is developed with the following view of human belief in mind. Consider the belief that an event E will occur (or has occurred or is occurring). An agent either entertains this belief or does not entertain this belief (i.e., there is no "grade" in entertaining the belief). If the agent chooses to exercise "the will to believe" and entertain this belief, he/she/it is entitled to a degree of confidence c (1 ≥ c 0) in doing so. Adopting this view of human belief, we conjecture that whenever an agent entertains the belief that E will occur with c degree of confidence, the agent will be surprised (to the extent c) upon realizing that E did not occur.