FMS attack-resistant WEP implementation is still broken

Authors:
Toshihiro Ohigashi;Yoshiaki Shiraishi;Masakatu Morii
Affiliations:
The University of Tokushima, Tokushima, Japan;Kinki University, Higashi-Osaka, Japan;Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
Venue:
CIS'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Intelligence and Security - Volume Part II
Year:
2005

Citing 2
Cited 1

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SAC '01 Revised Papers from the 8th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
A key recovery attack on the 802.11b wired equivalent privacy protocol (WEP)

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)

New Weakness in the Key-Scheduling Algorithm of RC4

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

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Abstract

In this paper, we present an attack to break WEP that avoids weak IVs used in the FMS attack. Our attack is a known IV attack that doesn’t need the specific pattern of the IVs. This attack transforms most IVs of WEP into weak IVs. If we attempt to avoid all weak IVs used in our attack, the rate at which IVs are avoided is too large to use practical. When using a 128-bit session key, the efficiency of our attack is 272.1 in the most effective case. This implies that our attack can recover a 128-bit session key within realistically possible computational times.