Password-based group key exchange secure against insider guessing attacks

  • Authors:
  • Jin Wook Byun;Dong Hoon Lee;Jongin Lim

  • Affiliations:
  • Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea;Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea

  • Venue:
  • CIS'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Intelligence and Security - Volume Part II
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Very recently, Byun and Lee suggested two provably secure group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols using n participant’s distinct passwords. Unfortunately, the schemes were found to be flawed by Tang and Chen. They presented two password guessing attacks such as off-line and undetectable on-line dictionary attacks by malicious insider attacker. In this paper, we present concrete countermeasures for two malicious insider attacks, and modify the two group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols to be secure against malicious insider password guessing attacks. Our countermeasures do not require additional round costs, hence they are efficient.