Secure delegation-by-warrant ID-based proxy signcryption scheme

Authors:
Shanshan Duan;Zhenfu Cao;Yuan Zhou
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
Venue:
CIS'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Intelligence and Security - Volume Part II
Year:
2005

Citing 6
Cited 2

Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes

Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols

CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proxy signatures for delegating signing operation

CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing

CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Digital Signcryption or How to Achieve Cost(Signature & Encryption)

CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption

PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography

Efficient proxy signcryption scheme with provable CCA and CMA security

Computers & Mathematics with Applications
A new proxy signcryption scheme using warrants

International Journal of Intelligent Engineering Informatics

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper, we first construct a security model for delegation-by-warrant ID-based proxy signcryption schemes and formalize notions of security for them. To the best of our knowledge, no related work has been done. Then we present such a scheme based on the bilinear pairings, and show that it is provably secure in the random oracle model. Specifically, we prove its semantic security under the DBDH assumption and its unforgeability under the BDH assumption.