Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Wireless sensor networks: a survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Cooperative Packet Forwarding in Multi-Domain Sensor Networks
PERCOMW '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Cooperation in underwater sensor networks
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Neighbor sensor networks: Increasing lifetime and eliminating partitioning through cooperation
Computer Standards & Interfaces
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Sensor networks are large scale networks consisting of several nodes and some base stations. The nodes are monitoring the environment and send their measurement data towards the base stations possibly via multiple hops. Since the nodes are often battery powered, an important design criterion for sensor networks is the maximization of their lifetime. In this paper, we consider multi-domain sensor networks, by which we mean a set of sensor networks that co-exist at the same physical location but run by different authorities. In this setting, the lifetime of all networks can be increased if the nodes cooperate and also forward packets originating from foreign domains. There is a risk, however, that a selfish network takes advantage of the cooperativeness of the other networks and exploits them. We study this problem in a game theoretic setting, and show that, in most cases, there is a Nash equilibrium in the system, in which at least one of the strategies is cooperative, even without introducing any external incentives (e.g., payments).