Information-flow and data-flow analysis of while-programs
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A language for systems not just software
Proceedings of the 2001 annual ACM SIGAda international conference on Ada
Industrial strength exception freedom
Proceedings of the 2002 annual ACM SIGAda international conference on Ada: The engineering of correct and reliable software for real-time & distributed systems using Ada and related technologies
Is Proof More Cost-Effective Than Testing?
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security
High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to Safety and Security
Enforcing security and safety models with an information flow analysis tool
Proceedings of the 2004 annual ACM SIGAda international conference on Ada: The engineering of correct and reliable software for real-time & distributed systems using Ada and related technologies
Ada-Europe'03 Proceedings of the 8th Ada-Europe international conference on Reliable software technologies
A New Approach to Memory Partitioning in On-Board Spacecraft Software
Ada-Europe '08 Proceedings of the 13th Ada-Europe international conference on Reliable Software Technologies
Hierarchical scheduling with ada 2005
Ada-Europe'06 Proceedings of the 11th Ada-Europe international conference on Reliable Software Technologies
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High integrity applications, such as those performing safety or security critical functions, are usually built to conform to standards such RTCA DO-178B [1] or UK Def Stan 00-55 [2]. Typically such standards define ascending levels of criticality each of which requires a different and increasingly onerous level of verification. It is very common to find that real systems contain code of multiple criticality levels. For example, a critical control system may generate a non-critical usage log. Unless segregation can be demonstrated to a very high degree of confidence, there is usually no alternative to verifying all the software components to the standard required by the most critical element, leading to an increase in overall cost. This paper describes the novel use of static analysis to provide a robust segregation of differing criticality levels, thus allowing appropriate verification techniques to be applied at the subprogram level. We call this fine-grained matching of verification level to subprogram criticality smart certification.