Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The POPCORN market—an online market for computational resources
Proceedings of the first international conference on Information and computation economies
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Market-based Proportional Resource Sharing for Clusters
Market-based Proportional Resource Sharing for Clusters
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
MapReduce optimization using regulated dynamic prioritization
Proceedings of the eleventh international joint conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
The networked common goods game
COCOA'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications - Volume Part II
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We study the resource allocation game in which price anticipating players compete for multiple divisible resources. In the scheme, each player submits a bid to a resource and receives a share of the resource according to the proportion of his bid to the total bids. Unlike the previous study (e.g.[5]), we consider the case when the players have budget constraints, i.e. each player’s total bids is fixed. We show that there always exists a Nash equilibrium when the players’ utility functions are strongly competitive. We study the efficiency and fairness at the Nash equilibrium. We show the tight efficiency bound of $\theta(1/\sqrt{m})$ for the m player balanced game. For the special cases when there is only one resource or when there are two players with linear utility functions, the efficiency is 3/4. We extend the classical notion of envy-freeness to measure fairness. We show that despite a possibly large utility gap, any Nash equilibrium is 0.828-approximately envy-free in this game.