Towards a market mechanism for airport traffic control

Authors:
Geert Jonker;John-Jules Meyer;Frank Dignum
Affiliations:
Institute of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University;Institute of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University;Institute of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University
Venue:
EPIA'05 Proceedings of the 12th Portuguese conference on Progress in Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We present a multiagent decision mechanism for the airport traffic control domain. It enables airlines to jointly decide on proposals for plan conflict solutions. The mechanism uses weighted voting for maximizing global utility and Clarke Tax to discourage manipulation. We introduce accounts to ensure that all agents are treated fairly, to some extent. The mechanism allows an airport to determine the pay-off between optimality and fairness of schedules. Also, it compensates for agents that happen to be in practically unfavourable positions.