Password Authentication Using Multiple Servers
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
A Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Server-Assisted Generation of a Strong Secret from a Password
WETICE '00 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Virtual Software Tokens - A Practical Way to Secure PKI Roaming
InfraSec '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on Infrastructure Security
On the Security of ElGamal Based Encryption
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Yaksha: augmenting Kerberos with public key cryptography
SNDSS '95 Proceedings of the 1995 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS'95)
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
PDM: a new strong password-based protocol
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
A forward-secure public-key encryption scheme
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
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Recently the concept of password-enabled PKI is an emerging issue to support user mobility. Virtual soft token and virtual smartcard were proposed as the password-enabled PKI. However, the virtual soft token does not support key disabling. In the virtual smartcard, the user must interact with remote entity per signing operation. In addition, both schemes do not support forward secrecy and instant revocation. In this paper, we propose a new approach that supports user mobility. The proposed approach supports key disabling and the user does not need interaction with the remote entity for each signature. Moreover, the proposed scheme allows instant key revocation. Thereby, the distribution of CRL is not required. Furthermore, the proposed scheme supports forward secrecy. In this sense, our scheme, implemented only software, is stronger than a long-term private key with physical smart cards. By forward secrecy and instant revocation, signing documents using a time-stamp provided by a trusted authority is not required to protect from modifying signed document by the adversary who knows private key.