Secure authentication scheme for passive C1G2 RFID tags

Authors:
M. Moessner;Gul N. Khan
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M5B 2K3;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M5B 2K3
Venue:
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Year:
2012

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Abstract

Privacy and security concerns inhibit the fast adaption of RFID technology for many applications. A number of authentication protocols that address these concerns have been proposed but real-world solutions that are secure, maintain low communication cost and can be integrated into the ubiquitous EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 tag protocol (C1G2) are still needed and being investigated. We present a novel authentication protocol, which offers a high level of security through the combination of a random key scheme with a strong cryptography. The protocol is applicable to resource, power and computationally constraint platforms such as RFID tags. Our investigation shows that it can provide mutual authentication, untraceability, forward and backward security as well as resistance to replay, denial-ofth-service and man-in-the-middle attacks, while retaining a competitive communication cost. The protocol has been integrated into the EPCglobal C1G2 tag protocol, which assures low implementation cost. We also present a successful implementation of our protocol on real-world components such as the INTEL WISP UHF RFID tag and a C1G2 compliant reader.