Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Choosing reputable servents in a P2P network
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
A reputation-based approach for choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
Resilient multicast using overlays
SIGMETRICS '03 Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Large-scale live media streaming over peer-to-peer networks through global internet
Proceedings of the ACM workshop on Advances in peer-to-peer multimedia streaming
To play or to control: a game-based control-theoretic approach to peer-to-peer incentive engineering
IWQoS'03 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Quality of service
Towards pre-standardization of trust and reputation models for distributed and heterogeneous systems
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The prevalence of emerging peer-to-peer (P2P) live broadcasting applications has practically demonstrated that they could scale to reliably support a large population of end users. However, these systems potentially suffer from two major threats: peers generally interact with unfamiliar partners without the benefit of trusted third party or verification authority, resulting in poor service if meeting with unreliable upstream nodes, while peers essentially tend to be selfish when it comes to the duty rather than the benefits and hence undermine the system performance. The trust and cooperation issues motivate us to investigate the design of trust-based incentive mechanism which establishes trustful relationship among peers and balances what they take from the system with what they contribute. The proposed TPOD mechanism leverages the statistical analysis to the practical service logs of client-server and P2P systems and effectively offers incentive through service differentiation. It goes beyond existing approaches in the following four desirable properties: (1)Trust-based; (2)Practical-oriented; (3)Objective metrics about past behaviors and (4)Distributed nature upon gossip-based overlay. The experiment results over PlanetLab verify its effectiveness.