Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Improved Steiner tree approximation in graphs
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
ACM Transactions on Multimedia Computing, Communications, and Applications (TOMCCAP)
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In this paper, we study how to share the payments to relay links among the receivers for multicast. Based on a strategyproof mechanism whose multicast tree is at most 2 times the optimal, we propose a payment sharing scheme that is $\frac{1}{n^2}$-budget-balanced, cross-monotonic, and in the core. We also prove that there is no payment sharing scheme that can achieve β-budget-balance and cross-monotonicity for $\beta= \Omega(\frac{1}{n})$. When both the relay agents and the receivers are selfish, we show a negative result: combining a strategyproof mechanism for the relay agents and a strategyproof sharing scheme for the receivers does not necessarily imply a strategyproof mechanism overall.