Search and replication in unstructured peer-to-peer networks
ICS '02 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Supercomputing
Trust and Reputation Model in Peer-to-Peer Networks
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
SLIC: A Selfish Link-Based Incentive Mechanism for Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Networks
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
An analysis of internet content delivery systems
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
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In order to deal with free riding in P2P system, incentive mechanism or rating system is presented, and each user rating is computed by itself, which causes that some users exaggerate their ratings. In this paper, three aspects are developed for free riding and for improving service performance in P2P. First of all, it is useful to keep away fake rating that each user rating is calculated by the responders. Secondly, three kinds of user ratings including single user rating and two group ratings are exploited to get better service performance. The last aspect is to provide a service strategy that is adaptive to the responder workload. Finally, the experimental results demonstrate that this strategy can effectively handle the problem of free riding, and especially, group ratings can greatly boost response rate of the whole P2P system.