A public key cryptosystem based on the word problem
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Church-Rosser Thue systems and formal languages
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A public-key cryptosystem based on language theory
Computers and Security
A public key cryptosystem based on Lyndon words
Information Processing Letters
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
String-rewriting systems
Cryptology: language-theoretic aspects
Handbook of formal languages, vol. 2
Tree-Manipulating Systems and Church-Rosser Theorems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Confluent and Other Types of Thue Systems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On Public-Key Cryptosystem Based on Church-Rosser String-Rewriting Systems (Extended Abstract)
COCOON '95 Proceedings of the First Annual International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Tree Replacement and Public Key Cryptosystem
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Proceedings of the 5th IMA Conference on Cryptography and Coding
Public-Key Cryptosystems Using the Modular Group
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Decision Problems for Semi-Thue Systems with a Few Rules
LICS '96 Proceedings of the 11th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
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This paper revisits a public key cryptosystem which is based on finite string-rewriting systems. We consider a new approach for cryptanalysis of such proposals—the so-called completion attack. If a particular kind of weak key is generated, then a passive adversary is able to retrieve secret messages with a significant probability. Our idea can be applied to other rewriting based cryptosystems as well. Finally we discuss issues concerning the practical usage and present some experimental results. The described vulnerabilities lead to the conclusion that at least the key generation of Oleshchuk’s cryptosystem has to be revised.