Short e-cash

  • Authors:
  • Man Ho Au;Sherman S. M. Chow;Willy Susilo

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong;Department of Computer Science, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, NY;Center for Information Security Research, School of Information Technology and Computer Science, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia

  • Venue:
  • INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

We present a bandwidth-efficient off-line anonymous e-cash scheme with traceable coins. Once a user double-spends, his identity can be revealed and all his coins in the system can be traced, without resorting to TTP. For a security level comparable with 1024-bit standard RSA signature, the payment transcript size is only 512 bytes. Security of the proposed scheme is proven under the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and the decisional linear assumption, in the random oracle model. The transcript size of our scheme can be further reduced to 192 bytes if external Diffie-Hellman assumption is made. Finally, we propose a variant such that there exists a TTP with the power to revoke the identity of a payee and trace all coins from the same user, which may be desirable when a malicious user is identified by some non-cryptographic means.