Formal analysis of dynamic, distributed file-system access controls

Authors:
Avik Chaudhuri;Martín Abadi
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, University of California, Santa Cruz;Computer Science Department, University of California, Santa Cruz
Venue:
FORTE'06 Proceedings of the 26th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal Techniques for Networked and Distributed Systems
Year:
2006

Citing 11
Cited 1

A calculus for cryptographic protocols

Information and Computation
Enforceable security policies

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication

POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Building secure file systems out of byzantine storage

Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Authenticating Network-Attached Storage

IEEE Micro
Strong Security for Network-Attached Storage

FAST '02 Proceedings of the Conference on File and Storage Technologies
Protection in Programming-Language Translations

ICALP '98 Proceedings of the 25th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Typing correspondence assertions for communication protocols

Theoretical Computer Science
Security for a high performance commodity storage subsystem

Security for a high performance commodity storage subsystem
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Formal security analysis of basic network-attached storage

Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering

Scalable security for petascale parallel file systems

Proceedings of the 2007 ACM/IEEE conference on Supercomputing

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We model networked storage systems with distributed, cryptographically enforced file-access control in an applied pi calculus. The calculus contains cryptographic primitives and supports file-system constructs, including access revocation. We establish that the networked storage systems implement simpler, centralized storage specifications with local access-control checks. More specifically, we prove that the former systems preserve safety properties of the latter systems. Focusing on security, we then derive strong secrecy and integrity guarantees for the networked storage systems.