Secure Broadcasting Using the Secure Lock
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Factoring polynomials using fewer random bits
Journal of Symbolic Computation - Special issue on computational algebraic complexity
Secure group communications using key graphs
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Simple and fault-tolerant key agreement for dynamic collaborative groups
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Key Agreement in Dynamic Peer Groups
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
On key distribution in secure multicasting
LCN '00 Proceedings of the 25th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
DISEC: A Distributed Framework for Scalable Secure Many-to-Many Communication
ISCC '00 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC 2000)
Secure Group Communication Using Robust Contributory Key Agreement
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
A Novel High-Order Tree for Secure Multicast Key Management
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Key distribution for secure multimedia multicasts via data embedding
ICASSP '01 Proceedings of the Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2001. on IEEE International Conference - Volume 03
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
New multiparty authentication services and key agreement protocols
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Towards secure and communication-efficient broadcast encryption systems
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Many emerging network applications are based upon group communication models and are implemented as either one-to-many or many-to-many multicast. As a result, providing multicast confidentiality is a critical networking issue and multicast security has become an active research area. To secure the sessions, a common group key is maintained to encrypt the traffic, and the key is updated whenever a new member joins the group or an existing member leaves. In this paper we analyze the security of a centralized key distribution protocol for one-to-many multicast and a decentralized key agreement protocol for many-to-many multicast. We show that they both fail to provide forward and backward security. The first protocol is revealed to be vulnerable to a single adversary due to an algorithmic issue. The second protocol, however, is subject to sophisticated collusion. Remedial approaches are proposed for both key management schemes to effectively resist relevant attacks.