Security analysis of password-authenticated key agreement protocols

  • Authors:
  • Kyung-Ah Shim;Seung-Hyun Seo

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Mathematics;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea

  • Venue:
  • CANS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Recently, there have been proposed a number of password-authenticated key agreement protocols for two-party setting or three-party setting. In this paper, we show that recently proposed three password-authenticated key agreement protocols in [11,12,10] are insecure against several active attacks including a stolen-verifier attack, an off-line password guessing attack and impersonation attacks.