ID-Based signature scheme without trusted PKG

Authors:
Jian Liao;Junfang Xiao;Yinghao Qi;Peiwei Huang;Mentian Rong
Affiliations:
Department of Electronic Engineering, ShangHai JiaoTong University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Electronic Engineering, ShangHai JiaoTong University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Electronic Engineering, ShangHai JiaoTong University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Electronic Engineering, ShangHai JiaoTong University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Electronic Engineering, ShangHai JiaoTong University, Shanghai, P.R. China
Venue:
CISC'05 Proceedings of the First SKLOIS conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Year:
2005

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Abstract

Key escrow is an inherent disadvantage for traditional ID-based cryptosystem, i.e., the dishonest PKG can forge the signature of any user. On the other hand, the user can deny the signature actually signed by him/herself. To avoid the key escrow problem, we present an ID-based signature scheme without trusted Private Key Generator (PKG). We also presented the exact proof of security to demonstrate that our scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen messages and ID attacks assuming the complexity of Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Compared with other signature schemes, the proposed scheme is more efficient.