Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Communications of the ACM
Efficient Identity Based Signature Schemes Based on Pairings
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Digital Signcryption or How to Achieve Cost(Signature & Encryption)
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Signcryption Scheme Based on Integer Factorization
ISW '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Security
A Signcryption Scheme with Signature Directly Verifiable by Public Key
PKC '98 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
Two birds one stone: signcryption using RSA
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Fully secure threshold unsigncryption
ProvSec'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Provable security
Provably secure identity-based threshold unsigncryption scheme
ATC'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
Signcryption schemes with threshold unsigncryption, and applications
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
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An identity-based threshold unsigncryption scheme is proposed, which is the integration of the signcryption scheme, the (t,n) threshold scheme and zero knowledge proof for the equality of two discrete logarithms based on the bilinear map. In this scheme, a signcrypted message is decrypted only when more than t members join an unsigncryption protocol and the signature can be verified by any third party. A formal proof of security of this scheme is provided in the random oracle model, assuming the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is computationally hard.