A simple characterization for truth-revealing single-item auctions

Authors:
Kamal Jain;Aranyak Mehta;Kunal Talwar;Vijay Vazirani
Affiliations:
Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA;College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta;Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley;College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta
Venue:
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2005

Citing 1
Cited 0

Competitive auctions and digital goods

SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

We give a simple characterization of all single-item truth-revealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibility of using variational calculus to design auctions having desired properties.