A note on the cramer-damgård identification scheme

Authors:
Yunlei Zhao;Shirley H. C. Cheung;Binyu Zang;Bin Zhu
Affiliations:
Software School, Fudan University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong;Software School, Fudan University, Shanghai, P.R. China;Microsoft Research Asia, Beijing, P.R. China
Venue:
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2005

Citing 6
Cited 0

How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems

Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A practical zero-knowledge protocol fitted to security microprocessor minimizing both transmission and memory

Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Zero-knowledge proofs of identity

Journal of Cryptology
Soundness in the Public-Key Model

CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols

CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fast and secure immunization against adaptive man-in-the-middle impersonation

EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In light of the recent work of Micali and Reyzin on showing the subtleties and complexities of the soundness notions of zero-knowledge (ZK) protocols when the verifier has his public-key, we re-investigate the Cramer-Damgård intended-verifier identification scheme and show two man-in-the-middle attacks in some reasonable settings: one simple replaying attack and one ingenious interleaving attack. Our attacks are independent of the underlying hardness assumptions assumed.