Strong password-only authenticated key exchange
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Public-key cryptography and password protocols
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Weaknesses of Lee-Li-Hwang's hash-based password authentication scheme
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Secure remote user access over insecure networks
Computer Communications
Provably secure password-authenticated key exchange using Diffie-Hellman
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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In 2005, Peyravian-Jeffries proposed secure password-based protocols for remote user authentication, password change, and session key establishment over insecure networks. These protocols, however, are still susceptible to a stolen-verifier attack. Accordingly, the current paper demonstrates the vulnerability of their protocols to a stolen-verifier attack and then, a simple solution to resolve such a problem is presented. In contrast to these protocols, the proposed solution can resist the stolen-verifier attack.