Models and tools for quantitative assessment of operational security
Information systems security
Human-computer interaction (2nd ed.)
Human-computer interaction (2nd ed.)
NSPW '96 Proceedings of the 1996 workshop on New security paradigms
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Proceedings of the 2002 workshop on New security paradigms
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SOUPS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 symposium on Usable privacy and security
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ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Software engineering
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The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we report on the results of our investigation of different categories of usability issues. On the other hand, we introduce the ideas of context descriptive security models as a means of mastering the usability challenges of highly dynamic systems. Modern computer systems are involved in many situations of our daily lives. This means that newly deployed systems must be carefully designed in order to be correctly used by laypersons. The scenario we introduce shows that it is no longer feasible to argue that users must be educated in order to correctly operate these systems. As soon as such a system is deployed, for example, in a supermarket, the education-barrier will not be accepted: neither by the customer nor by the provider.